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Reflections on the Post-Partition Period: Life Narratives
of Kashmiri Muslims in Contemporary Kashmir

Hafsa Kanjwal

This article examines the political subjectivities
of the first generation of post-Partition
Kashmiri Muslims and presents their life
narratives, both written and oral, as an
important vantage point from which to
understand shifts in Kashmiri Muslim society
in the early post-Partition period. It also
explores how these narratives are mediated
by the respondent’s present, a period after
the militancy of the late eighties and nineties,
but one in which there remains a mass
uprising against Indian rule. This generation
was important for a number of reasons. One,
they witnessed the erosion of Kashmir’s
autonomy and the promises of a plebiscite, as
well as intense political repression. Two, they
were enlisted in the project of state reform
and nation building, and thus, effectively
participated in those same processes of
erosion. As a result, I argue that the conditions
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and uncertainty surrounding the Kashmir
‘dispute’ led to a political subjectivity that
sought coherence amidst contradiction and
incommensurate political and ideological
commitments. In particular, this coherence was
reflected in the desire to assert and foreground
a Kashmiri Muslim identity, one that existed
alongside other class, regional and gendered
identities, but was nonetheless sharpened
as a political community. I conclude with a
reflection on the importance of this generation
to understanding the making of political
subjectivities in Kashmir today.
Keywords: Kashmir, Muslim, Partition, life narratives, militancy,
oral history.

Introduction
A vast majority of Kashmiri Muslims who went to
India for study, had a sort of hatred for India, but
the air was so oppressive that they couldn’t express
it. The Kashmiri educated middle class always lived
in such a dichotomy. When a Kashmiri Muslim was
engaged in government service, he was an Indian.
But at home, he was a Pakistani. He cried if
Pakistan lost a cricket match, but then when it was
time to go to office he changed from his pheran1 to
Western clothes, took dictates from his bosses, and
somehow became instrumental in suppressing his
own people (Dr. Mir Nazir Ahmed, former
Medical Superintendent).
The above quote illustrates the complex entanglements of
political ideology, religious identity, and class aspirations
that defined Kashmiri Muslims in the early post-Partition
period.2 After the monumental Partition of the Indian
subcontinent in 1947, Kashmiri Muslims found themselves divided between the new nation-states of India and
Pakistan (Snedden 2012).3 As a separate political community that had its own political visions and direction in the
late colonial period, they did not seamlessly fit into the
political trajectories of either.4 Those in the Indian-held
state of Jammu and Kashmir had to deal with multiple
contradictions and dilemmas. One, as contestations over
the future of Kashmir still remained unresolved, they
witnessed the erosion of Kashmir’s autonomy and the
promises of a United Nations-mandated plebiscite, as well
as intense political repression. As the Indian government
sought to stamp out the “provisionality of Kashmir’s
accession to India”, declaring Kashmir to be an integral
part of India, political repression was meted out by both
the central government, as well as the local Kashmiri state
government (Duschinski, et al., 2018: 15-18).5 The latter
operated under a veneer of democracy, stifling all dissent,
whereby the demand for a plebiscite by local Kashmiris
was seen as an ‘antinational position’, and oppositional
perspectives were censored or jailed. Paradoxically,
Kashmiri Muslims had to negotiate their own aspirations
for modernity and progress after decades of poverty
and misrule under their princely rulers, the Dogras. In
the context of state-led socio-economic and educational
reform, and patronage that sought to empower the local
population, Kashmiris became dependent on the state,
“torn between [their] subordination to the state and [their]
aspirations for national liberation” (Duschinski, et al 2018:
14-15). By actively taking part in the state apparatus, they
contributed to the processes of erosion of the demand for
a plebiscite. Furthermore, they also had to situate their

political aspirations vis-a-vis the two new nation-states of
India and Pakistan, both of which laid claims to the entire
state, and whose borders were heavily militarized. As this
article will illustrate, this paradoxical context and these
multiple, sometimes conflicting, aspirations (for example,
a desire for a political resolution for Kashmir through the
plebiscite as well as a desire for jobs and employment)
were to leave an impact on the political subjectivities of
this post-Partition generation. This article seeks to understand what that impact was, and in doing so, shed light on
the ways in which conflict, war, or occupation shape the
subjectivities of those who live under its logic of rule and
governance. How did Kashmiri Muslims reconcile their
personal aspirations with the political context prevalent
in the state? How did they justify their participation in the
very state that sought to undermine their political rights
and demands? How did they traverse the political possibilities made available to them? And finally, which of these
dilemmas or tensions endure today?
This article examines the political subjectivities of the
first generation of post-Partition Kashmiri Muslims and
presents their life narratives, both written and oral, as an
important vantage point from which to understand shifts
in Kashmiri Muslim society in a time of significant change.6
It primarily engages with those Kashmiri Muslims who
were either part of the Kashmiri bureaucratic state or the
primary beneficiaries of state-led policies of socio-economic and educational reform, which included land reform
and free education.7 Indeed, the early post-Partition
period in Kashmir saw the creation of an upwardly mobile,
educated Muslim middle-class that was complicit in the
everyday work of the state and bureaucracy. In addition,
it also explores how these narratives are mediated by the
respondent’s present, a period after the armed resistance
of the late eighties and nineties, but one in which there
remains a mass uprising against Indian rule.8 As Kashmiri
Muslims attempted to navigate the complex political and
social terrain of Kashmir’s disputed status in the early
post-Partition period, I argue that their life narratives
reflect an attempt to seek coherence amidst contradiction
and incommensurate political and ideological commitments. In particular, the search for coherence in these
life narratives was reflected in a desire to assert and
foreground a Kashmiri Muslim identity, one that existed
alongside other class, regional, and gendered identities,
but was nonetheless sharpened as a political community.
Recent scholarship on Kashmir has engaged with the
concept of political subjectivities in important ways,
drawing attention to the contingent nature of the formation of political subjectivities as a result of broader social
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and economic dynamics. Most have primarily focused on
the pre-Partition period, as well as the period after the
armed resistance of the late eighties. Chitrelekha Zutshi
explores how Kashmiri-ness in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries was related to both regional and religious
forms of belonging, and how both were linked to the
broader economic and political dynamics of their time
(Zutshi 2004). Mridu Rai has examined how Islam played an
important role under the Dogras, arguing that the protest
by Kashmiri Muslims adopted a religious idiom because the
Dogra state itself was religiously politicized along Hindu
lines (Rai 2004). Other scholars have examined particular
groups, including the political subjectivities of members of
the Kashmiri left in the period before and after Partition
(Whitehead 2010) as well as the subjectivities of Kashmir’s
minority communities, including the Kashmiri Pandits as
well as various communities living in the different regions
in the princely Jammu and Kashmir state (Duschinski 2018;
Bhatia 2018; Sokefeld 2018; Robinson 2013; Snedden 2011;
Bhan 2013). These studies have examined the interplay
between the ideologies and practices of the state and the
making of political subjectivities amongst these diverse
communities. For example, Mona Bhan has examined, in
the context of Ladakh, and specifically Kargil, how Indian
state and military investments in humanitarianism and
welfare were instruments to enforce modes of consent
and subjectification (Bhan 2013). In turn, the political
subjectivities that were produced were highly aligned
with the imperatives of defense and security (ibid). Cabeiri
Robinson has examined the shifting subjectivities and
frames of reference of Kashmiri refugees in Azad Kashmir
after Partition and after the militancy. The refugee identity
was transformed as displaced Kashmiris sought to negotiate their multiple relationships with social and political
sites of power to include the international community
(Robinson 2013). Building off these studies, this article
focuses primarily on the immediate post-Partition period,
and how it helps us understand the making of Kashmiri
Muslim political subjectivities. By focusing on the educated
bureaucratic class, it also helps us situate the dynamics
that went into the processes of state-formation and
nation-building. Furthermore, it is important to note that
the desire to seek coherence through religious identity
continues in the post-Partition period, because the Indian
state was still perceived as the religious ‘other.’
Methods
This article relies on a mix of oral interviews, autobiographies, and memoirs. I conducted nearly 25 semi-structured
interviews in Srinagar, the capital of Indian-held Kashmir,
between September 2013 and August 2014. This pool is
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a generational sample; many of the individuals who can
speak directly to the post-Partition period have passed
away and some were not available to be interviewed
due to illness or old age. My positionality as a Kashmiri,
from a Muslim family that had been involved in the state
bureaucracy at the time, was critical in opening doors,
especially in speaking with former bureaucrats. Thus,
after meeting a few individuals that were known to my
family, I was directed to the others, which resulted in
snowball sampling. Most of my respondents identified as
Kashmiri Muslims who had been involved with state institutions, either as government officials, doctors, teachers,
students, or engineers. This is important context for this
article, given my interest in understanding the nature of
complicity with state institutions at this time. The ages of
the generation that was in the actual bureaucracy in the
immediate post-Partition period ranged in their eighties
and nineties at the time of the interview. Those who were
students at that time were in their seventies. A majority
were male, while three were female. This gender disparity
is reflective of the proportion of men to women in the
upper and lower echelons of the government bureaucracy
in the immediate post-Partition period. A number of the
women who were involved in state bureaucracy have
already passed away; my interviews were with those
who either taught or studied in the schools and colleges
at the time.
Most of my respondents were born and lived in Srinagar,
often from the Old City (known colloquially as ‘downtown’)
and moved to neighborhoods constructed for government
employees in the fifties and the sixties. This results in an
‘urban-bias, in this sample. Aside from those who came
from families that were involved with local shrines, most
of the families were in business, and in particular, shawls,
handicrafts, and other small-scale cottage industries. A
handful came from the few Muslim families that served in
the government under the Dogras. They were primarily
educated in government-run schools or in schools run by
the anjuman (association) Nusrat ul Islam, including the
prominent Islamia High School, which schooled many
members of the bureaucratic class. Two males had left
Kashmir in the first two decades after Partition, and settled
in Pakistan, returning to Kashmir in recent years either
to visit family or for political reasons. One female had left
Kashmir in the seventies and was now settled in the United
States. One of my respondents was a Kashmiri Pandit, a
retired English professor from the Women’s College in
Srinagar who was one of the few Pandits to remain in
Kashmir during the militancy and is included to provide
perspective on how inter-religious relations transformed.
All of my respondents benefited in some way from state

policies, either by obtaining admission in educational institutions or gaining employment in the state’s bureaucracy,
which helped solidify their family’s financial status and
upward mobility. A few were educated in Lahore before
Partition, while some were trained in Aligarh, Amritsar,
or Lucknow after Partition. Some were sent by the Jammu
and Kashmir government for additional training to the
United States or the United Kingdom. Others remained in
Srinagar for all of their higher education. Most continue
to live in Srinagar, although they may travel to visit family
in Delhi and other cities in India, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
During the course of the interviews, I asked a number of
questions regarding their families, childhood, schooling
days, and work life. Some of my respondents addressed
these questions directly, while many focused on pivotal
events in their life, specifically around key moments in
Kashmiri history, and provided additional details upon my
prompting. At many times, I had to re-direct the conversation from their interpretation of Kashmiri history—and
the various betrayals of the Kashmiri leadership—towards
their own life and experience. The desire to present a
collective and corrective history (primarily in contrast to
state or Indian and Pakistani nationalist narratives) was
one that many of my respondents shared. The interviews
were conducted in a mix of English, Kashmiri, and Urdu.
I met with some individuals for six meetings, and others
for one. With a few, crucial details regarding their role in
the bureaucracy or any tensions they faced as Kashmiri
Muslims emerged after multiple meetings, once ‘trust’ was
developed between me and the respondent.
The importance of these oral narratives in attempting
to understand shifts in Kashmir’s post-Partition period
cannot be understated. It is through these oral narratives that we see a desire to construct a uniquely
Kashmiri subjectivity, one that seems to get subsumed
by state-centric narratives of this period that peddle
Indian or Pakistani nationalist lines. Not only do these
oral narratives provide an alternative history to state
narratives, they also depict the desire that individuals
and communities have to project a sense of ‘wholeness’,
despite shifts and contradictions, which Katherine Ewing
has described as a “universal semiotic process by which
people manage inconsistencies” (Ewing 1990: 253). Ewing
argues that each self-concept is “experienced as whole
and continuous, with its own history and memories that
emerge in a specific context, to be replaced by another
self-representation when the context changes” (ibid). In
the context of Kashmir, these narratives show how the
respondents are constructing ‘new selves’, in response

to ‘internal and external stimuli’. Their context limits
the available set of self-representations that emerge, and
this is also crucial to understanding the range of political
aspirations that emerge. For example, a number of my
respondents mentioned how they supported the National
Conference, a party that later supported the accession to
India in the pre-Partition period, because of its seemingly
secular and progressive social and economic policies. In
the post-Partition period, however, these same individuals
grew disillusioned with the National Conference, and as
‘secularism’ became associated with suppressive state
ideology, sought recourse to movements that appeared to
be more religiously inflected.
In addition to these oral interviews, this article also
engages with autobiographies and memoirs. The most
prominent autobiography is of the first prime minister of
the state, Sheikh Abdullah, entitled Aatish-i-Chinar, which
was published in 1982, before the militancy. The rest were
published after, including accounts written by former
Chief Ministers Syed Mir Qasim and Farooq Abdullah,
political leaders of the Plebiscite Conference such as Mirza
Afzal Beg and Munshi Ghulam Ishaq, religious leaders such
as Qari Saifuddin of the Jamaat-i-Islam and educationists,
including Agha Ashraf Ali. While I reference a number of
these writings, I rely primarily on an autobiography by
a premier female educationist and the former principal
of the Women’s College: Shamla Mufti. This is primarily
because Mufti’s autobiography goes beyond the realm of
political intrigues in Kashmir and speaks directly to issues
of social and cultural transformation within families,
homes, schools, colleges, and workspaces. Her account,
therefore, gives us a unique perspective that is not found
in the narratives of the Kashmiri male political and
religious leadership. Mufti was one of the first Kashmiri
Muslim women to receive her master’s degree, in Aligarh.
Her autobiography was originally written in Kashmiri
and was then translated into Urdu in 1998 under the title
Chilman se Chaman (translated as From Darkness to Light).
Writing in the nineties, Shamla provides an overview of
her family background, education, marriage and home life,
experiences working in the schools and colleges, as well as
travels outside of Kashmir.
Given that how people remember and what they
remember is historically specific and contextual to the
time of writing and contexts of telling, “remembering
has a politics” (Smith and Watson 2010: 22-25). Since all
of the oral interviews were conducted after 2008, the
present iteration of the conflict, in which hundreds of
Kashmiri youth have been killed in the latest phase of
protests against the Indian state, has permeated these life
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narratives. The period of the armed resistance in the late
eighties and nineties permeates in the autobiographies
and memoirs. This context, which resulted in accelerated
violence and militarization, has significantly shaped the
ways in which the early post-Partition period is remembered. Thus, the ‘history’ of this period and the ‘memory’
of this period overlap and diverge in particular ways.
In situating these narratives, I use the framework of
“collective remembering”, which allows me to understand
how individual recollection is constantly mediated by
larger cultural politics (Smith and Watson 2010: 25). The
collective remembering of pertinent historical events or
themes dominates the life narratives of my respondents,
which revolve around particular moments of crisis,
including Partition and the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah
as well as particular themes of Muslim empowerment
and inter-religious relations.9 As we will see, most of my
respondents spoke of the past not as individuals, but
in reference to a broader Kashmiri Muslim collective
history. The Kashmiri Muslim ‘subject’, while marked by
important fractures, which I note below, was thus constituted through reference to these historical accounts.
What is important to note is that this identity emerged
out of a sense of a shared political context, as the actual
religious practices of my respondents varied. In addition,
given that most of these life narratives represented a
particular constituency of educated Kashmiri Muslims,
I do not situate them as speaking for or on behalf of all
Kashmiri Muslims at this time. However, these narratives
are important as they reflect on broader processes of state
formation and nation building, complicity, and collaboration, in which the construction of a Kashmiri Muslim
identity was deeply implicated. What is interesting, then,
is to understand why or how these narratives seek to speak
in relation to a broader identity, not that they actually do.
I identify a number of themes that re-emerged in these
life narratives, both oral and written. The four predominant themes were: situating themselves in a particular
Islamic lineage and geography, and highlighting the stark
condition of Kashmiri Muslims under the Dogras; the
ideological divergences amongst Kashmiri Muslims and the
complexity of Partition; the contingent nature of people’s
decisions and attitudes towards Pakistan in the aftermath
of accession and Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest; and finally,
relations with Kashmiri Pandits. Ultimately, these themes
bring our attention to how post-Partition political and
social developments consolidated these respondents sense
of a ‘Kashmiri Muslim identity’.
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Situating the Muslim Middle Class and Dogra Rule
Most of the life narratives began with the narrator’s family
background, or khandan, in an attempt to situate their
ancestry in a particular Islamic lineage that traced its
origins to Central Asia. Particular reference was made to
whether one’s family was sayyid, peer, or Kashmiri Hindus
who had converted to Islam. Sayyids were descendants
of the first Muslim families in Kashmir, who traced their
lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. A group of sayyid
missionaries arrived in Kashmir in the fourteenth century
with Shah-i-Hamdan, a Persian Sufi and religious scholar
who was seen as influential in spreading Islam to Kashmir
(Khan 2003: 139-167). Peers were those families who had
ties to prominent Sufi orders, and were well-versed in
Persian, including poetry, and the religious sciences. Many
were caretakers of shrines. Many of the first educated
Muslims in Kashmir came from these two types of families,
which were broadly considered as khandani, or of ‘good’
and noble family name. To be of khandani background was
not the same as being wealthy, as some khandani families
were not well off. Rather, it was a conceptualization of
social status that depended more on family name and heritage. At times, those families that were highly educated,
but were not sayyid or peers, were also considered khandani.
A majority of Kashmiri Muslims were Hindu converts,
many of them lower caste Hindus that were attracted to
the egalitarian mission of the Sufi orders (ibid). One of my
respondents referred to them as “aborigines” of the land.
The desire to narrate a particular Islamic lineage permeated all life narratives, including those Kashmiri Muslims
who self-identified as secular or not practicing, as well as
those who were more religiously inclined. For example,
Syed Mir Qasim, one of the primary left-leaning leaders
of the National Conference and the former Chief Minister
of the state (1971-1975), begins his autobiography by
speaking of his ancestors who arrived in Kashmir from
Iraq “four hundred years ago” (Qasim 1992: 1-5). Qasim’s
family is from the Village of Doru in South Kashmir, near
Verinag. He describes how his father’s uncle, who recorded
the family’s history in Persian and also wrote on the life of
the Prophet Muhammad, tells him of his family heritage
as a sayyid, from the line of Shah Mohammad Syedullah,
who arrived in Kashmir in 1664 (ibid). In an interview,
Ghulam Hassan Shah, a retired Indian Administrative
Services officer, also began by describing his family’s sayyid
origins on both his maternal and paternal sides, showing
me a shehjar, or family tree, that was hung on the wall of
his living room.10 “There was a lot of emphasis…most of
the families would write ‘Syed’ as a prefix to their name,”

he explained, “they were considered noble, they didn’t
fight with people, couldn’t harm anyone” (Interview with
participant, Srinagar, 12 June 2014). Sheikh Abdullah
also begins his autobiography by describing his family
as having converted from Hinduism, ‘an aborigine’, but
situates his birthplace, Soura, as having spiritual importance for Kashmiri Muslims because it was the home of a
prominent saint (Abdullah 2013: 22-24).
Shamla Mufti’s autobiography provides a rich account
of life under Dogra rule for Kashmiri Muslims. Not only
does she highlight the importance of khandan, but she also
marks a shared geopolitical space, reliant upon important
landmarks and a sense of history. She begins her narrative
by providing her family background, and in particular,
situates herself as coming from a peer family. Shamla is
born as the youngest of four in 1925, the beginning of the
reign of Majaraja Hari Singh, the last Dogra ruler. Her
family lives in a neighborhood called Chisty Koach, close
to the banks of a branch of the Jhelum River in Srinagar.
On both sides of her family, Shamla traces her peer lineage
to religious scholars and teachers. While sharing a copy of
her family tree in the text, she also adds that her father’s
ancestor, Mullah Mohammad, was a close associate of a
popular sixteenth century Kashmiri saint, Makhdoom
Sahib, for whom a shrine is named in Srinagar. Her
mother’s family is affiliated with the prominent Chisty
Sufi order. On her maternal side, her ancestor, Sheikh
Muhammad Ali Chisty, obtained his training from the
order and would do dhikr in a loud voice, so that his friends
and loved ones were also made aware of the practices of
the order. Sheikh Chisty was also responsible for showing
the hair of the prophet on important religious occasions
at the Hazratbal Shrine. Shamla’s father is a teacher in an
Islamic school and her mother, although she was never
formally schooled, read the Quran, which she taught to
her children.
Throughout her narrative, when recalling her memories
of Srinagar city, Shamla shares the names of important
shrines and religious spaces, and their significance for
Kashmiri Muslims. For example, she mentions the bazaar
named after Saeed Ali Akbar Sahib, another Sufi saint
whose grave is in that area. When speaking of her in-law’s
home, she provides details of the nearby Jamia Masjid,
which serves as an important gathering place for followers
of the Mirwaiz, a title given to the preacher of the
mosque and spiritual leader for Kashmiri Muslims. Her
in-laws are involved in the work of ‘fatwagiri’ or giving
religious opinions.

Most of the life narratives stress an Islamic genealogy and
geography, an ‘origin narrative’ that I argue contributes
to a particular ‘Muslim’ history of Kashmir, one that
gets elided in official narratives—both scholarly and
state-propagated—that either focus on the Hindu history
of Kashmir or its syncretic history, based on the notion
of Kashmiriyat.11 The desire to assert this history could be
interpreted in two different ways. One, it is possible that
this is a reflection of the exclusivist meanings that are
now being given to Kashmiri identity; in other words, that
this identity is synonymous with a sense of ‘Muslim-ness’.
For example, Chitrelekha Zutshi sees this development
as a direct challenge to Kashmiriyat, a narrative that
Kashmiri nationalists constructed in the mid-twentieth
century to “draw Kashmir into the ambit of a secular
India, while still maintaining its distance from it” (Zutshi
2018: 7). She argues that Kashmiriyat is under fierce attack
“in the context of the contemporary conflict, especially
between India and Kashmir, as Kashmiris seek to distance
themselves from India and claim a greater identification
of Kashmir with the Islamic world, defined increasingly
in West Asian rather than South Asian terms” (ibid).
Zutshi’s analysis fails to address why Kashmir needs to
be reclaimed exclusively on South Asian terms given its
history at the confluence of multiple regions, including
Central Asia. It also views an affiliation with the Islamic
world as a problem in and of itself, without explaining
what that entails and why. Furthermore, it situates
Kashmiriyat as a natural, objective narrative for the
history of Kashmir, without acknowledging the way that
Kashmiriyat was in and of itself a political construction in
its time.
While an interpretation of an exclusivist Islamic identity
is possible, it is not reflected by the some respondents’
discussion of their relationships with Pandits, which I go
into below. Rather, I suggest that the desire on the part
of these life narratives to focus on a ‘Muslim’ history of
Kashmir is to challenge the state-sponsored dominant
narratives of a shared, syncretic history that either erased
or undermined Kashmir’s ‘Muslim’ identity in attempts to
seek connection with India. The focus of these life narratives on that ‘Muslim’ identity is to contest and reclaim
that history. In addition, an attempt to include histories
of learning, writing, language (Persian), and cultural
interchange, especially between Central Asia, the Arab
world, and Kashmir, is also revealing. Instead of seeing this
solely in an Islamic exclusivist paradigm, I suggest that
this discussion of origins can be seen as a desire to expand
the geographical contours of Kashmir from the limitations
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of modern statehood, and the hardening of boundaries,
which have situated Kashmir staunchly in the realm of
‘South Asia’ (which Zutshi seems to have no issues with).
For my respondents, Kashmir was a civilizational hub, of
language, literature, and religious exchange; a discussion
of these older modes of interchange and influence also
underscores then how those connections were dismantled
and disrupted with the arrival of the Dogra regime, and
most recently, the Indian state.
While most of the life narratives began with the Dogra
period, a few went as far back as the Mughal period in
Kashmir, describing it as starting Kashmir’s ‘foreign
rule’. Their narrative followed a historical account of the
Mughals, and then recalled the ‘repressive Afghan and
Sikh rules’. The discussion of Dogra rule began with the
‘sale’ of Kashmir to the Dogra ruler through the Treaty of
Amritsar in 1846. It continued with a few key moments,
including the ‘Shawlbaf Protest’, during which 28 shawl
weavers were killed at the hands of the Dogra army for
protesting against unjust taxation in 1865; the submission of a memorandum in 1924 by a number of Kashmiri
Muslim elites to British Viceroy Lord Reading, highlighting
the stark conditions of the Muslims; and finally, the
events around 1931, what is known as the beginning of
the Kashmiri freedom struggle against Dogra rule. In one
such example, Shamla describes how the children would
be able to see Haji Rather’s bridge from their home, and
hear of the ‘Shawlbaf Protest’ from their elders, marking
an important incident in the history of Dogra oppression
against Kashmiri Muslims. According to her elders, a
Kashmiri Pandit ran the shawl factory, taking a tax of five
rupees of the eight a shawl weaver would earn. When the
weavers attempted to meet with the government to speak
of this injustice, the officials denied them the meeting.
They started a procession, and the Dogra army attempted
to stop it. On the bridge, the army fired, and a number of
them were thrown into the Jhelum River and drowned.
Shamla describes this incident as the first in a long line of
revolts against injustice, which became the shape of a fullfledged movement in 1931 (Mufti 1994: 24). Here, popular
history is narrated to provide a sense of a shared experience of repression under the Dogras, and, reflecting on the
contemporary moment, a longer history of revolts against
injustice that goes into Kashmir’s pre-Partition period.
Whether a Kashmiri Muslim’s family background was khandani or not, a vast majority of the life narratives referred
to the repressive rule of the Dogras for all Muslims. They
spoke of the Muslim peasants’ economic exploitation
under the feudal system and a lack of education. The
educated class complained of discrimination when seeking
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employment (Abdullah 2013). Many mentioned that their
family members went outside Kashmir to places like
Lahore in Punjab for better educational and economic
prospects. And while Kashmiri Pandits also complained
of being discriminated against under the Dogras—as
evidenced by the state-subject movement of the 1920’s—in
these life narratives, Dogra rule was not simply oppressive
towards Kashmiris, but in particular, towards Kashmiri
Muslims. I suggest that this is because in the 1930s and
1940s, when most of the respondents were still coming
of age, Pandits were much more represented in the
state’s administration as well as in schools and colleges.
In contrast, the mostly Muslim peasantry was suffering
under heavy taxation. As a result, Dogra oppression was
seen as exclusively being meted out to Kashmiri Muslims,
which allowed for a sense of a shared history of struggle.
As Mridu Rai has stated, it was because of the “lack of
recourse available to Kashmiri Muslims from a Hindu king
that at the moment of their most dire need they turned
to the divine or spiritual realms rather than to the state”
(Rai 2004: 9). She argues that the invocation of religion,
especially in terms of the forms of resistance against Dogra
rule, by Kashmiri Muslims in the period between 1846 and
1947 suggests a “positive cultural and religious affiliation, quite as much as attempts flowing from material
concerns to rectify a sense of religiously based discrimination perpetrated by a Hindu state” (ibid). Given that the
Dogras politicized religious identities in their processes
of state-making, as Rai has shown in her work, there is,
therefore, a longer history of asserting religious identities
for counter-hegemonic aims. What is an interesting shift in
the context of the post-Partition period, however, is that
the state is ostensibly secular, and does not rely on religion
to construct its legitimacy, as it did under the Dogras. I
suggest that the desire to assert a Muslim identity in the
post-Partition period had less to do with the secular nature
of the Kashmiri state government, and more to do with its
practices of state-formation, which enabled a number of
contradictory subjectivities that had to be reconciled.
The struggle against Dogra rule was a common theme
in all of the narratives; some of the individuals who had
reached early adulthood during that period also wrote or
spoke of their own involvement in the struggle against
the Maharaja, while others recalled what they perceived
as ‘Muslim backwardness’ in that period. Syed Mir Qasim
declared that he was “born at a time when the mountains
of Kashmir echoed with the sighs and wails of the helpless
subjects of the Maraharaja Hari Singh’s repressive rule…
every shanty had a tale of hunger and tyranny” (Qasim
1992: v). By situating himself in the Kashmiri freedom
struggle, Qasim attempted to provide legitimacy to his

narrative. He continued that he was only 14 years old when
he “raised the banner of revolt against a rich landlord who
had exited his poor tenant from his house. [He] collected a
big crowd and made his first public speech… [the] incident
gave [him] confidence in [his] own oratory and catapulted
[him] into politics with a missionary zeal” (ibid).
By both situating themselves within a broader Islamic
lineage and spiritual geography in Kashmir, and also
foregrounding the condition of Kashmiri Muslims in the
pre-1947 period, the life narratives I collected shared some
striking similarities in how they began, and how they
provided context for an individual’s life. They situated
themselves firmly within a larger moral and cultural
universe of Islam, and recalled their experiences by
speaking to a shared sense of a Kashmiri Muslim community, one that had its own ‘history’, with key dates, places
and events that had shaped its trajectory in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. They also explicitly rejected
a shared Kashmiri Muslim and Pandit backwardness under
the Dogras.
In the life narratives of the Kashmiri Muslims, the desire
to assert a ‘Muslim’ identity and history was, perhaps,
in response to the communalized political discourse
throughout India. However, these individuals wanted
to highlight their sense of ‘difference’, in opposition or
outright rejection of the exigencies of an Indian national
identity, not their ‘loyalty to the nation’. This shared
sense of a particular history today, however, did not entail
that the community was marked by a sense of coherence.
Indeed, we will see how people recalled a number of ideological divergences that marked Kashmir’s transition from
Dogra rule.
From Jinnah to Nehru: Ideological Divergence and the
Complexity of Partition
Scholarship surrounding Partition in Kashmir revolves
around Sheikh Abdullah and his ostensibly secular nationalist political party, the National Conference, and their
alliance with Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National
Congress.12 While some scholars mention the role of the
Muslim Conference, which was a pro-Pakistan party and
more in line with the Muslim League, Mirwaiz Yusuf
Shah and his followers were seen as a minority voice
in the Valley whose Muslims evidently denounced the
two-nation theory, and were behind Sheikh Abdullah. The
disappearance of those who espoused alternative politics
from the archives, and thus, from most scholarly work, is a
defining trait of most scholarship, but is beyond the scope
of this article. However, the story that emerges from the

life narratives speaks to a much more complicated series of
loyalties and allegiances, a story that exists, as it were, in
popular memory.
The National Conference emerged from the Muslim
Conference in the late 1930’s, in an attempt by Sheikh
Abdullah to secularize the future direction of the freedom
struggle against Dogra rule. Thus, many members of the
National Conference were initially the founders of the
Muslim Conference, and still held many of the same ideas
as before, but went along with the Sheikh for strategic
purposes. After the creation of the National Conference,
the Muslim Conference was not active for some years, but
became active once again in the early 1940s, especially
in Jammu, under the leadership of Chowdhary Ghulam
Abbas, a Muslim leader from Jammu. The life narratives did not provide a definitive demographic of each
groups’ supporters, but they do suggest that the Muslim
Conference also had a presence in the Valley. It appeared
that the Muslim Conference enjoyed a stronghold in the
Old City of Srinagar from a more traditional elite class
of Muslims or from rural Muslim landlords who were
opposed to the National Conferences’ emphasis on land
reform.13 Many of these were khandani families, often with
Sufi backgrounds. The National Conference, on the other
hand, enjoyed ascendency with the more left-leaning,
newly educated classes, those who were not necessarily
from khandani backgrounds. In Chilman se Chaman,
Shamla described this as the sher (lion)—bakra (sheep)
split (lions were supporters of Sheikh Abdullah and the
National Conference, while the sheep were supporters
of Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and the Muslim Conference). She
described her in-laws, with whom she lived for much of
her early married life, as being supporters of the Muslim
Conference, and narrated how the men and women would
go to the Jamia Masjid every Friday to hear Mirwaiz’s
sermon (Mufti 1994: 97). She recalled one particular incident when Muhammad Ali Jinnah of the Muslim League
visited Kashmir in 1944. In front of nearly 100,000 people,
he spoke at the Jamia Masjid, propagating the two-nation
theory. Shamla remembered how she and the women of
the house also attended the speech, and saw Fatima Jinnah,
his sister, sitting in their midst.14
Qari Saifuddin, one of the founders of the Jamaat-iIslam in Kashmir, considered himself a supporter of the
National Conference until he attended Jinnah’s speech.
In his autobiography, he stated that Jinnah’s historic
address “changed the way of thinking of the educated
class, with the two-nation theory being acceptable, but
a large majority here were still holding the flag of the
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National Conference” (Saifuddin 1980: 22). The reasons,
he continued, were twofold: one, the National Conference
“tarnished the reputation of the educated Muslims place
to place by calling them ‘government agents’ or ‘beggars of
government jobs’—unfortunately, educated Muslims were
very rare and few in number” (ibid).
As Kashmiri Muslims increasingly studied outside Kashmir
in the 1930s and 1940s, they came across a wide spectrum
of political ideologies that were at play in British India. For
those Kashmiri Muslims who founded and became active
in the National Conference, the struggle against Dogra
rule and left-leaning political trends in the subcontinent
played an important role in shaping their politics. Dr. Mir
Nazir Ahmed, who studied medicine in Lucknow in the
1950s, shared the story of his father, Mir Ghulam Rasool,
who was one of two Muslims selected by the Maharaja
to go to Harvard for engineering in the 1930s. He spoke
to me of the other Kashmiri Muslims, mostly men, who
went to Aligarh and Lahore for their studies: “The air was
thick with Quit India,” he stated, “they got caught up in
it”. When describing his father and his fathers’ colleagues’
initial support for the National Conference, he explained:
They developed a dichotomy in their thoughts…
they would recite Alamma Iqbal and go into a
trance with his poetry, at the same time, they were
influenced by Mahatma Gandhi and Satyagraha.
These were antagonistic views. Only few had a
clear-cut idea of what they would want. My father
was caught up in this middle…this is what happened to most Kashmiris who were educated (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 15 December 2013).
For Dr. Nazir, an attraction to Iqbal and Gandhi is seen
today as an ‘antagonistic view’, given the diverging
trajectories of both of their ideologies over time. Whether
it was seen as antagonistic for people at the time is less
clear. Even Sheikh Abdullah, who aligned his politics with
the Indian National Congress affirmed his appreciation
for Iqbal, who is usually credited with providing the
ideological backdrop to the idea of Pakistan. The Sheikh
even named a building in the University of Kashmir after
him. For the Sheikh, being committed to Islam did not
mean that one could not be a secular nationalist. In fact,
he declared that his nationalist convictions came from the
Quran. This perspective, of course, is not so different from
those Muslim leaders in India who aligned themselves with
the Indian National Congress, such as Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad and Maulana Husssain Ahmed Madani. As some
respondents clarified, a number of Kashmiri Muslims were
attracted to the progressive aims of the Indian National
Congress, as well as its purported secularism, as they knew
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they needed the help and support of Kashmiri Pandits
in their fight against the Dogras. Crucially, they also
believed, or were led to believe, that they would be able
to enjoy autonomy in an independent India. In their eyes,
the feudal interests that were backing the Muslim League
would not allow Kashmiris to enact land reforms and
other progressive policies in the state.15 Aside from these
ideological concerns, I also gathered from these narratives
that the National Conference was seen as the more modern
party; at a time when Kashmir’s Muslims were desperate
to catch up with the rest of the world, the National
Conference was ideally situated to bring Muslims out of
their purported backwardness. As Qari Saifuddin noted
in his autobiography, “in those days it was very rare to
see the educated youngsters who had a beard, a majority,
rather a big majority of educated people were ashamed to
have a beard. They thought it was a sign of backwardness
and ignorance. They felt proud to shave it off (Saifuddin
1980: 31). The beard, in this case, symbolized ‘tradition’, a
physical marker that must be removed in order to cultivate a particular modern sensibility.
Most of the life narratives acknowledged Sheikh Abdullah’s
popularity at the time of Partition, especially given the
National Conferences’ anti-monarchical campaign. Yet,
some of my respondents clarified that support for Sheikh
Abdullah did not necessarily entail support for the Indian
National Congress, or India. Indeed, a few shared with me
how a number of National Conference leaders were firmly
against the accession. One was Anwar Ashai, a retired engineer and former student activist. He was part of one of the
first classes to study engineering at the National Institute
of Technology. Anwar was also the son of Ghulam Ahmed
Ashai, an educator, who was seen as being a close associate
of the Sheikh and was instrumental in the creation of the
University of Kashmir, of which he served as the registrar
during the Sheikh’s government (1947-1953). Anwar’s
father was one of the few Muslims who served in the
Maharaja’s administration, but was also involved in the
Muslim Conference, and later, in the National Conference.
Although his government employment did not allow him
to fully take part in the National Conference, as a senior
Muslim official, he would give its members advice and help
them with their statements. However, Anwar recalled that
his father was not attracted to the socialist leanings of the
National Conference, but rather its emphasis on empowering Kashmiri Muslims, especially through education.
Ghulam Ahmed Ashai came from a prominent khandani
family, which had ties to the Naqshband Sufi order. He
stood first in his Master’s in Persian at Aligarh. Anwar told
me how his father had travelled to various cities in India
before Partition. According to Anwar, his father “became

aware of the insecurity of Muslims in India, he had seen
it firsthand, he knew it would not be good for Kashmir”
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 21 February, 2014).
He was skeptical of the sincerity of the Indian nationalist
leadership towards Kashmir, and attempted to persuade
Sheikh Abdullah against aligning the National Conference
with them, but as Anwar recalled, the Sheikh was too
“lured by power” (Interview with participant, Srinagar,
21 February, 2014). Ghulam Ahmad Ashai was also not
drawn to Pakistan for reasons that seem less clear; Anwar
believed that his father would have preferred an
independent Kashmir.
The confusion that Kashmiri Muslims faced around the
time of Partition, and their varying attraction to and skepticism of the two main parties, was a recurring theme in
most of the life narratives. It was in the process of making
sense of the varying ideologies at the time, that a Kashmiri
Muslim political subject was being shaped, one that was
responding to multiple aspirations. What we can make
from this ‘confusion’ however is that support for either
party was based on a series of local concerns, whether it be
the consolidation of class interests, the desire for political
and economic empowerment, or the desire to end monarchical rule. It was not only linked to the divisions between
the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress in the
subcontinent, although it was, at various points, informed
by it. Nonetheless, when the time for Partition came, it
was the impending tribal raid from Pakistan that drew a
number of Kashmiri Muslims into the fold of the National
Conference and its defense against the raid. They felt that
they had no choice; they had heard reports of the brutality
and were prepared to defend Kashmir against aggression.
This did not mean, however, that they sided with India, as
we will see. Those Muslims who were staunchly pro-Pakistan, or aligned with the Muslim Conference voluntarily
went across the border to Pakistan, or were forcibly sent
there by the Sheikh’s government.16
However, as we will see below, my respondents stated
that in the post-Partition period, the brutality of Sheikh
Abdullah’s government towards its dissenters, in addition
to India’s increasing interference in Kashmir’s affairs
(outside of the involvement in defense, foreign policy, and
communications as marked by the Treaty of Accession)
and Hindu nationalist politics in Jammu and elsewhere, led
many Kashmiri Muslims, even those that were previously
open to the limited accession, to desire an alternative
political arrangement.17 Yet, as I detail, fear and the
contingent nature of this period made it difficult for many
of them to act.

Pakistan, the Aftermath of Accession, and Contingencies
After the Sheikh’s Arrest
When trying to get a sense of the ideological shifts that
occurred after partition, I was struck by the ways in which
some of my respondents spoke of their perspectives
after partition, which to me, appeared to be in conflict
with their public personas as members of the seemingly
pro-Indian bureaucratic class. Although a number of the
life narratives referred to the ‘confusion’ faced by Kashmiri
Muslims before the accession and the multiple influences that were at play in shaping their ideology, a vast
majority of them described how a majority of Kashmiri
Muslims, including those who considered themselves to
be more secular, were pro-Pakistan in the aftermath of
the accession, and especially after the Sheikh’s arrest in
1953.18 What did it mean to be pro-Pakistan in this time,
especially when Pakistan was the only other political
option made available under the conditions of the United
Nations mandated plebiscite? To be sure, recollecting
this ‘memory’ could be influenced by the contemporary
moment, which is marked by increased anti-India sentiments in the Valley. My respondents might not have felt
comfortable divulging if they were, indeed, in support of
India in the past. Incidentally, however, this perspective
was shared by Karan Singh, the son of Maharaja Hari Singh
and Governor of Kashmir, with Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s. In a collection of his letters
to Nehru, Karan Singh repeatedly expressed his misgivings
surrounding the loyalties of Kashmiri Muslim bureaucrats,
calling upon Nehru to increase central representation
in Kashmir’s bureaucracy (Alam 2006: 124-125, 141).
Nonetheless, many Kashmiri Muslims went on to take
various postings in the Bakshi administration after Sheikh
Abdullah’s arrest. This may seem bewildering at first, given
Bakshi’s strong pro-Indian stance, but must be understood
in the context of post-Partition developments in Kashmir.
At the time of the tribal raid, Sheikh Abdullah wrote in
his autobiography that the perspective of Pakistan had
been tarnished amongst Kashmiri Muslims (Abdullah
2013: 363). Yet, nearly all of my respondents mentioned
that most of the Muslims in Kashmir, aside from some
members of the senior National Conference leadership,
were pro-Pakistan. Being pro-Pakistan in this time ranged
widely: some believed that Muslims would be safe in
Pakistan and could ‘progress’, while others were dismayed
by Hindu right wing politics in India, which had reached
their borders in the form of the Praja Parishad in Jammu.
Some expressed nostalgia for the social and economic
connections between Kashmir and cities in the Pakistan
part of Punjab, while others, including those involved in
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the Jamaat-i-Islam, expressed the desire for a moral state
that would be rooted in Islam. The most common factor,
however, was that they became disillusioned by increasing
Indian interference in Kashmir, including the Indian hand
in Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, which suggests the level to
which this stance was intended as a potent rejection of
India. As many respondents mentioned, the events of
August 1953 solidified anti-Indian sentiment amongst
many Kashmiri Muslims. Even Syed Mir Qasim, former
Chief Minister, in his autobiography, declared “the faith of
people in Kashmir in democracy and in rule of constitution
had shaken…when Sheikh was disposed” (Qasim 1992: vii).
Agha Ashraf, a prominent educator, added that with the
arrest of the Sheikh, “the whole [of] Kashmir had erupted,
there were demonstrations from morning until evening
in every part of Kashmir, and people in herds joined these
processions. This was a type of referendum” (Ali 2010). It is
interesting that Agha Ashraf is not clear what this ‘referendum’ was for. It could have been in favor of Pakistan
given the options for a plebiscite at the time would have
only included India and Pakistan, but it is also possible
that it was simply a referendum against India, suggesting
that people’s political desires might not have fit squarely
into pro-India or pro-Pakistan stances. As Agha Ashraf
wrote in the contemporary period where notions of an
‘independent Kashmir’ are more popular, one wonders if
the unclear reference to a referendum would have entailed
an expression of a pro-Kashmir sentiment, one that was
tied, in this time, to the identity of Sheikh Abdullah.
Nonetheless, being pro-Pakistan, albeit for varying
reasons, was an example of how the Kashmiri Muslim
identity evolved in the post-Partition period.
Khalil Fazili, who was one of the Kashmiris that went to
Pakistan in October 1948, met me in Srinagar, where he
was visiting his family and friends. Khalil was working
with the Dogras before Partition, but had a number of
issues with his employer. In his words:
At the time, most people were with Pakistan, they
felt that Muslims would be safe there. There was no
thinking of an Islamic state… People who went to
Pakistan were starting to feel insecure about their
positions in Kashmir. They saw that the Pandits had
all the jobs, Muslims were discriminated against.
So they moved. They had the idea that they would
do well professionally, for their families, their
futures… and there were so many historical connections between Lahore and Kashmir. People had
businesses there, it made more sense for people to
go there (Interview with participant, Srinagar,
1 June 2014).
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Khalil mentioned that his reason for going to Pakistan was
also because of discrimination in Kashmir; it was not for
any religious reason as he was more “secular minded”.
Khalil’s desire to assert himself as a secular Muslim, here,
is important, as is his mention of an ‘Islamic state’. He
provided a list of reasons for why Kashmiris were attracted
to Pakistan; none of them were drawn from any sort of
‘religious ideology’. He repeated this point a number of
times, perhaps to contest Indian and Pakistani nationalist tropes that foreground religious ideology as being a
determinant of people’s choices at the time. Furthermore,
in today’s global context that has increasingly been
defined by the War on Terror, many Kashmiri Muslims
did not feel comfortable foregrounding any desire for an
‘Islamic state’ at that time. For them, Pakistan represented
a state where ‘Muslims would be safe’, rather than one
defined by a particular religious ideology. This question
has undoubtedly been debated in the historiography of the
Pakistan state.19 Whatever the shift in the ideology of the
Pakistan state may be today, Khalil reiterates that his idea
of Pakistan then, did not entail what Pakistan is now (a
state that is increasingly defined by its religious ideology):
“no one had imagined Partition and what would happen.
They had no idea about Muslim state or Islamic state… they
didn’t know what that would bring them” (Interview with
participant, Srinagar, 1 June 2014).
Ghulam Hassan Shah also mentioned to me that:
Kashmiri Muslims in the bureaucracy wanted to go
to Pakistan…. They thought that it was better for
Kashmir to go to Pakistan because it was a Muslim
country, we would be safe there, and because Indian Hindus had started showing their teeth one way
or another (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 12
June 2014).
While Shah did not clarify what he meant by “showing
their teeth,” I took it to mean that despite ‘Indian
Hindu’ deference to secularism, many Kashmiri Muslims
perceived that they were, in fact, communal. This perception animated a number of my conversations, as many
made reference to the contemporary state of communal
tensions in India exacerbated by the rise of the Bharatiya
Janata Party and right-wing politics. The discussion of
contemporary politics in Pakistan was much more unsettled. A number of my respondents became defensive,
arguing that had Kashmir gone to Pakistan at the time, the
country would not be in ‘the state it is today’. They argued
that Pakistan, ‘despite its problems’, was the only country
that raised the issue of Kashmir internationally. Others
suggested their indignation at the contemporary political
malaise in both India and Pakistan, arguing that neither

country had the best interests of Kashmiris in mind
and had exploited the issue to serve their own national
interests. While most respondents were able to differentiate between their impressions of Pakistan then, versus
Pakistan today, their perspectives on India after Sheikh
Abdullah’s arrest appeared to be consistent overtime.
Khalil mentioned the historical connections between
Lahore and Kashmir, as one of the reasons why Kashmiris
were more attracted to Pakistan, which was reiterated
by a number of respondents (Interview with participant,
Srinagar, 1 June 2014). One of the biggest changes they
encountered after Partition was that they were no longer
able to travel to places like Lahore and Rawalpindi,
where a number of them had gone for higher education
or business. This was one of the primary closures of the
post-Partition period. The loss of ties to the regions that
became Pakistan was described in both emotional and
material terms. Many families had individuals who left
for Pakistan, or were exiled there, and were unable to see
their family members for long stretches of time. In his
autobiography, Agha Ashraf recalled his trip to Lahore
with his grandfather, and how ‘modern’ it seemed to him
after coming from Srinagar. It was in Lahore, he stated,
that he “used a fork and knife for the first time” (Ali 2010:
12). Thus, Pakistan was seen as a space where this aspiration for modernity, that all of my respondents shared,
could be met. Some mentioned how Kashmiris would use
rock salt from Pakistan, which stopped coming to Kashmir,
leading to a shortage of salt in the first few years after
Partition. Rock salt and a green handkerchief became an
important political symbol for Pakistan; indeed, leaders
of the Plebiscite Front, a political opposition organization
that led the demand for a plebiscite, would raise both the
salt and the handkerchief in rallies and tell those who were
gathered, ‘This is our foundation’. Furthermore, Zahid
G. Mohammad, a writer, stated that Kashmir’s historic
economic ties to Central Asia went through Pakistan.
Timber and fruit would be transported along the Jhelum
and into other parts of Central Asia. Kashmiri businessmen
suffered great losses when this route was blocked after
1947. Nighat Shafi, who runs a non-government organization, and was one of the granddaughters of Ghulam Ahmad
Ashai, mentioned that her grandmother would keep asking
the other family members when the road to Pakistan
would open again.
Dr. Naseer Shah, the former principal of the Government
Medical College in Srinagar, was studying in Lahore at the
King Edward Medical College at the time of Partition, and
was repatriated to Srinagar. Because of the heightened
sense of insecurity at the time, he explained his fear that

Pakistani officials might see him as a spy. His sister, Miss
Mahmooda Ali Shah, who was one of the first Kashmiri
Muslim women to get educated in Lahore and was involved
with the National Conference, told Nehru to speak to
Liaqat Ali Khan and asked that her brother be sent back
to Srinagar safely. Dr. Naseer is known amongst this class
of individuals for being one of the few Kashmiri Muslim
men to marry a Kashmiri Pandit woman. Dr. Naseer’s wife,
Dr. Girja Dhar, was also a prominent doctor in the Valley.
They met, and married in London, where they had lived for
some years for work. Dr. Naseer explained that his family
was ‘secular’ and ‘open-minded’ and did not subscribe to
the Muslim Conference, but they still wanted to be with
Pakistan. He explained:
We were all fascinated to be a part of Pakistan.
No one was sure what would happen, but most of
us were educated in Lahore. Rawalpindi was next
door. It cost 10 rupees to go there on government
transport. The bus would leave Srinagar at 9am and
arrive in Rawalpindi at 3pm. The drivers knew my
family… sometimes we even got a free ride. None
of us ever thought of Delhi… it was so far. From
Delhi, the newspaper would come after four days.
But the papers from Lahore would be here the next
morning (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 25
June 2014).
This imaginary of Pakistan, unlike the recent de-territorialized turn in Pakistan scholarship, is territorially
grounded. Pakistan was a space that many people had
economic, filial, and educational ties with a place that was
much more ‘proximate’ than India.
If so many Kashmiri Muslims from this class were opposed
to the accession and wanted to join Pakistan at the time,
why did they continue to take part in the bureaucracy,
especially after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest? I posed this question to my respondents. In their responses, most referred
to the precarious nature of their decision at this time.20 A
majority of my respondents told me that people did not
think that the halaat (situation) would go on indefinitely.21
Even after the Sheikh was arrested, they assumed that
since the matter was raised in the United Nations Security
Council, India and Pakistan would resolve the issue and
a plebiscite would soon take place. In the meantime, my
respondents felt that they must get educated, build the
infrastructure in the region, and remain employed in the
bureaucracy. The realization that things could soon change
was also exemplified by their desire to remain in the
Valley, and not be transferred to other places in the state,
including Jammu. Nighat Shafi told me “a lot of Kashmiri
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Muslims didn’t agree to be posted in Jammu…because they
thought that things would change and Kashmir might go
to Pakistan” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 5 May
2014). Besides this, many were afraid of being in a Hindumajority place, as they had “heard that none of the Hindus
rent their houses to Muslims,” a sentiment that lends
itself once more to the notion of Pakistan being ‘safe’ for
Muslims (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 27 February
2014). In another example, Mohammad Amin Chisti,
who served as a registrar in the University of Kashmir,
revealed that he “didn’t agree to go to Jammu because of
the threat… Many Muslims were scared by the killings of
thousands of innocent Muslims there” (Interview with
participant, Srinagar, 27 February 2014).22
The Kashmiri state also conducted propaganda about
political and social developments in Pakistan, which may
have also impacted my respondents’ decision to remain in
the bureaucracy. The Department of Information gathered
material that highlighted how the Pakistani state was
beholden to imperial—namely American—interests and
was also interfering in the politics of Azad Kashmir. This
perception was oftentimes affirmed by letters that were
sent between Kashmiris residing in Pakistan and their
families in the Valley. I came across one letter sent by
Ghulam Ahmad Ashai to his son Ghulam Qadir, who had
been exiled to Pakistan by Sheikh Abdullah. The letter
is dated 8 August 1952, and was sent from Raj Bagh, in
Srinagar, to Bohar Bazaar, in Rawalpindi. While the letter
was written before Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, it is still
important as it points to perceptions about conditions in
Pakistan that may have persuaded a number of educated
Kashmiris to reconsider their fate with India. In the letter,
Ghulam Ahmad Ashai wrote of his meeting with his relatives, G.K. Drabu:
I have not met G.K. Drabu yet, but to those who he
had met, he has given me a really grim and woeful
picture of the state of affairs on that side and of the
moral and social degradation which is rampant in
your country. His account of your and Yasin’s life
also is not such as could give any satisfaction to any
parent. I wish to God that you may be still be saved
from the vicious and undesirable habits that seem
to be so common there. G.K. Drabu’s own habits so
exhibited here make me tremble for both of you.
It seems that your country is taking the lead in
practicing everything and the utmost that is both
un-Islamic and immoral. However, so long as your
present mood lasts, I feel myself utterly helpless
and can only pray to God that he may keep you safe
even in that filthy atmosphere. If the treatment of
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the rulers to our people there is insulting as stated
by Yasin and confirmed by Drabu, why in the name
of heaven do people like you suffer this insult
and stay on? The only honorable course in such
circumstance would be to give up everything, come
home and carry on a relentless struggle against the
designs of those people by exposing them naked
to those who still may have any misunderstanding
about them. After all, if it is to be subservience, better have it until there is some respect attached to it.
The greatest justification for the stand taken up by
the party in power here is the treatment that our
people are… [undecipherable]… over there, even
in conditions when they had need in fact keen and
urgent need of the utmost goodwill of our people.
I wonder how they would behave if they obtained
power here (Ministry of States, 1952).
While Ghulam Ahmad Ashai did not state explicitly what
concerned him, it appears that far from being a ‘safe place
for Muslims’, these reports from family members who
had travelled to or lived in Pakistan spoke of ‘moral and
social degradation’ in that ‘filthy atmosphere’. Aside from
these moral concerns, Ashai also made reference to the
“treatment of the rulers to our people there” (Ministry of
States, 1952). It is possible Ashai was referring to the shift
in the Pakistani leadership’s approach to the province in
1952. As Christopher Snedden carefully details, Pakistanadministered Kashmir, which initially enjoyed some
autonomy as a province, came into the fold of Pakistan’s
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, which allowed the Pakistani
state’s interests in the region to remain paramount
(Snedden 2012). For this reason, perhaps, Ashai urged his
son to come back to Kashmir, and let those who still had
faith in the Pakistani state know of the developments on
the other side of the border. It might not be far-fetched
to assume that these discussions permeated throughout
the educated and bureaucratic classes, given that many
of them had family members who were in Pakistan,
and led a number of individuals to forego their initial
support for Pakistan. This is an important consideration
given that most of my respondents still defined Kashmiri
aspirations in the post-Partition period as being aligned
with Pakistan. How do we understand the contradictions
between their recollections of their views of Pakistan then
and Ashai’s letter? I suggest that the range of political
possibilities made available to Kashmiri Muslims in this
time were restrictive; neither Pakistan nor India was able
to fully accommodate Kashmiri aspirations at the time.
While one option appeared to be more attractive than the
other, there was a complex range of social and political

subjectivities that were continuously being shaped and
reshaped by the restrictive conditions under Indian rule
and political conflict.
The contingencies of the period were also marked by
financial insecurity. A number of bureaucrats spoke of
their financial concerns at the time. In one case, Abdul
Sattar Mir, who was a secretary in the bureaucracy,
acknowledged the poverty and financial strain that
informed his, and many others’ decision to get a government job. Financial insecurity and the reign of fear that
pervaded the state, both under the Sheikh and Bakshi,
were the two primary reasons that many bureaucrats
stated they remained ‘silent’ on the political developments
in Kashmir.
Even those belonging to parties that were ostensibly
against the state, such as the Jamaat-i-Islam, were also
beholden to its patronage and had to ‘compromise’ due to
financial need. Qari Saifuddin wrote in his autobiography
how his friend, Syed Qaiser Qalander, worked as a program
assistant at Radio Kashmir. Qalander asked Saifuddin
to broadcast a radio program on Islam. The chief of the
Jamaat-i-Islam party at the time, Saad Uddin, informed
Saifuddin that he should not go on the state-run radio as
“it would be a meaningless effort of patching the truth
with falsehood and it will give no benefit to religion”
(Saifuddin 1980: 36). Nevertheless, Saifuddin mentioned
how his father became ill and he had to pay for his sister’s
wedding, leaving him with little financial means. Under
these conditions, Saad Uddin allowed Saifuddin to accept
the position at Radio Kashmir, which temporarily resolved
his financial problems. He noted however, that while he
was to speak on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, he was
told not to mention particular incidents that might rouse
public sentiment, such as the Battle of Badr, a key battle in
the early days of Islam, in which the Prophet’s community
won against his opponents, the tribe of Quraysh, in Mecca.
In the eyes of the officers at Radio Kashmir, perhaps
speaking of a ‘Muslim victory’ over non-Muslims would
raise sentiments against India in the region.
When speaking to former bureaucrats, many of them
reiterated that despite working in the bureaucracy,
they had remained committed to empowering Kashmiri
Muslims, and they had ‘no other options’ at the time.
Some said that had Kashmiri Muslims not taken an active
part in the bureaucracy, the government would have
relied upon Indians from throughout the country, “who
would not have had Kashmiris best interests at heart,” to
formulate policy in the region (Interview with participant,
Srinagar, 5 May 2014). Others stated that their jobs in the

bureaucracy were apolitical and were simply for purposes
of administering Kashmir. Ghulam Hassan Shah said that
he “never did anything that would help the Government
of India, so [he doesn’t] feel bad” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 12 June 2014). When Shah was in the
Law Department, he maintained that he “translated and
interpreted [the law] in ways that it would suit Kashmir…
Never felt that I was doing what the Government of India
wanted me to do” (Interview with participant, Srinagar,
12 June 2014). In this conversation, Shah mentioned an
argument he had with Jagmohan, the infamous Governor
of Kashmir, a few years before the militancy began. At the
time, Shah was the Chairman of the Selection Board that
hired individuals for various posts in the bureaucracy. He
narrated that Jagmohan wanted him to hire more Kashmiri
Pandits for various positions. Shah informed him that “90%
of the community is Muslim, and therefore they should
get 90% of the postings” (Interview with participant,
Srinagar, 12 June 2014). As he remembered this incident,
Shah stated that he had been afraid, but he told Jagmohan
“to his face that he would not do anything that is wrong”
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 12 June 2014). He
speaks of this moment with pride, as he felt that he had
not succumbed to or compromised on his principles in the
face of an Indian Government official. As we will see in the
conclusion, today’s bureaucrats in Kashmir repeat these
justifications given for taking part in the post-Partition
bureaucracy, although in a different political context than
that of my respondents, but nonetheless underscoring the
conflicting subjectivities that conflict societies produce.
As most of my respondents explained, there were very few
Kashmiri Muslims that were ‘Indians by heart’. Even those
that were in the National Conference leadership, they
stated, considered themselves Kashmiris first as being an
‘Indian’ was a practical matter for them. Mushtaq Fazili,
a retired engineer, who was sent by the government to
study engineering in Bangalore, told me how he never
identified as an Indian; he always identified as a Kashmiri
Muslim. This is despite “religion not playing a big role
in [his] family…more preference was given to education
than going through rituals. The focus was on being a good
human being” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 24
August, 2014). The only group that fully aligned themselves with India, Mushtaq mentioned, were the Kashmiri
Pandits. “They always said they were the true Indians”
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 24 August, 2014). It
is to the conflicted attitudes towards Kashmiri Pandits to
which I turn next.
The voices that emerge from this section reflect the
challenges of the early post-Partition period, and more
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importantly, showcase the ways in which my respondents
negotiated their everyday realities under Indian rule.
These narratives trouble the ‘secular’ subjectivity that is
usually associated with India as well as a ‘religious’ subjectivity that is associated with Pakistan. Whether or not they
viewed their decisions to participate in the state government as a ‘compromise’ at the time, my respondents today
express it as such, suggesting a greater sense of an ideological coherence over time. Almost all of my respondents
recalled that people were anti-India, but participated in
the state government and its institutions out of necessity.
The desire to forge a Kashmiri Muslim subjectivity in the
context of political uncertainty and contingency then
remains an important insight gleaned from these narratives. It is possible that the making of a Muslim subject
was in response to accusations that these individuals were
betraying the Kashmiri ‘cause’ and serving as ‘collaborators’. Therefore, the forging of a religiously-based
subjectivity also reflected their heightened awareness of
being complicit in government bureaucracy.
On Kashmiri Pandits
Discussions of relations between Kashmiri Muslims and
Kashmiri Pandits were fraught with a number of tensions.
Nonetheless, they remained coherent in their description of similarities and personal friendships between
members of the two communities, while at the same time
denouncing what was seen as the Pandit’s allegiance
to and ‘working for’ India at the expense of Kashmiri
Muslims, which left a number of them to feel betrayed.
This desire to assert one’s positive relations with Pandit
neighbors, friends, and colleagues must be situated in the
context of fraught tensions between the two communities today, a lingering impact from the militancy and the
forced departure of a majority of the Pandit community
outside of Kashmir. My respondents often tried to explain
the absence of Pandits to me, and acutely reflected on the
causes of the toxic relations today.
Most of my respondents recalled how they respected and
looked up to Kashmiri Pandits. Dr. Naseer mentioned how
they were seen as being more cosmopolitan and educated
than Kashmiri Muslims. Others mentioned how most of
the good teachers were Kashmiri Pandits, as they were
interested in their work, and the Muslim teachers ‘would
not be as interested’. Many families would hire Pandit
teachers to give their children tutoring in various subjects,
and unlike the Muslim teachers, the “Pandit teacher would
make sure that the students would understand the material” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 17 November
2013). Pirzada Hafizullah Makhdoomi, who was a Political
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Conference activist at the time, mentioned how Pandits
were the seat of Kashmiri culture and language, “which
is now dying after they left” (Interview with participant,
Srinagar, 17 November 2013). Neerja Mattoo, the only
Kashmiri Pandit I spoke to, recalled how the Pandit and
Muslim bureaucrats would mix: “they all came from downtown, were upwardly mobile, had a modern way of life.
They were educated, lived in bungalows and brought land”
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 24 May 2014). She
had many Muslim friends, and they did not “even notice
the difference,” she repeated a few times (Interview with
participant, Srinagar, 24 May 2014). They would “watch
films, wear the same clothes and hairstyles, and eat in
each other’s homes” (Interview with participant, Srinagar,
24 May 2014). She clarified that the earlier generation
would not eat together, but for her generation, it was
‘not an issue’. Some Muslims also spoke of how Kashmiri
Islam was unique because “we were originally Kashmiri
Pandits…proud of the Sufi aspect of Kashmiri Islam which
is mystical and draws upon Shaivism and Nund Rishi”
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 17 November 2013).
While earlier my respondents felt the need to assert a
history of Kashmir that spoke directly to its Islamic past,
when asked about Pandits, they unequivocally reiterated
their important role in Kashmir’s cultural history,
as well as the ‘Sufi aspect of Kashmiri Islam’. This
suggests that my respondents did not seek to elide other
communities from Kashmir’s history, but rather assert
a Muslim identity that they felt was being erased from
dominant narratives.
Even those affiliated with Islamist politics, such as Qari
Saifuddin, presented their relations with Pandits in
Kashmir in a positive light. He saw Pandit officials as
being honest, while the National Conference’s Muslim
leaders were disingenuous. He mentioned how a Pandit
lawyer, Jia Lal Chaudhary, defended him and others who
were charged with engaging in a riot against the National
Conference. At the same time, however, he noted his opposition to a cartoon that was printed in the paper, which
showed the heads of the three main faiths in Kashmir—
Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism— as being part of one body.
Under the cartoon, it was written: “Naya (new) Kashmir
will be religion of Kashmiris, they look three, but they all
are one [sic]” (Saifuddin 1980: 33). Saifuddin said he found
the statement to be intolerable:
Is new Kashmir to be the religion of Kashmir?…
In the evening I made this sentence and cartoon
my topic of speech. I emotionally criticized the
new Kashmir and the maker of new Kashmir. The
audience was silent because in this area, to be vo-

cally angry on Kashmir’s leadership, it’s like a blast
which rocked the whole area (Saifuddin 1980: 33).
Here, again, Saifuddin is expressing opposition to the
state and its ideology of Kashmiriyat, that he sees as
undermining Islam, not necessarily one that appears to be
intolerant of other religions.
Despite the friendly relations between individual Muslim
and Pandits, a number of my respondents referred to
varying moments in recent history in which the relations
between the two communities were challenged. M.A. Chisti
described how 1931 played a pivotal role as that is when
‘the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims had begun’. He stated:
There were a few incidents of misbehavior of Muslims with their Hindu neighbors, though they were
very few, some of the Pandit neighbors and those
living in other Muslim majority areas, preferred
to move to Pandit dominated areas. Then in 1947,
when tribesmen attacked the Valley, they moved
to other places, some of them even to neighboring
Punjab and Delhi. In 1990, there was almost complete exodus from the valley of Kashmiri Pandits.
When they lived in the Valley though, Muslims
had very good relations with them (Interview with
participant, Srinagar, 27 February, 2014).
1947 was seen by some in a different light, however. As
Ghulam Hassan Shah emotionally recalled, “Kashmiri
Muslims protected all Hindus at the risk of their life…we
can’t live without them. It didn’t even matter that they
were all pro-Indian” (Interview with participant, Srinagar,
12 June 2014). Nonetheless, he added that the situation
changed after 1947, as Pandits began to see themselves as
‘Indian instead of Kashmiris’. Makhdoomi situated 1953
as the turning point, as it became increasingly clear that
“Pandits were for India, and Muslims were for Pakistan”
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 17 November 2013).
Even the bastion of Kashmiriyat, Sheikh Abdullah, wrote
in his autobiography that Kashmiri Pandits would use
themselves as instruments of tyranny against the majority
community, perhaps referring to a number of Kashmiri
Pandits in Srinagar and in Delhi who were instrumental in
his arrest (Abdullah 2013). Almost all said that the differing
ideologies did not get in the way of their personal friendships with Pandits, however.
Neerja Mattoo mentioned that some of the Hindus might
have ‘resented’ the land reform acts, given that much
of the landed aristocracy was Hindu, but that her father
and his associates, who were involved in the National
Conference, were happy to give up their land. According
to her, resentment started building as more accommodation was made for Kashmiri Muslims in the schools and

government bureaucracy. Zahid G. Muhammad described
this as Kashmiri Pandits being “unable to reconcile to
Kashmiri Muslims growing in society or accepting them
as their equals” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 14
November 2013). The last straw was when protests arose
after a Kashmiri Pandit girl married a Muslim in the late
sixties. Right-wing Hindu parties in India tried to exploit
the situation, and the Kashmiri state government jailed
and beat up a number of Pandit protestors. This was one of
the turning points in the relationship between the
two communities.
When asked why the Pandits had left in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, a number of my respondents looked
uncomfortable. One looked away and said, “They didn’t
want to leave…but I can’t say much” (Interview with
participant, Srinagar, 25 June 2014). Makhdoomi only said
that he “had heartache when they left” (Interview with
participant, Srinagar, 17 November 2013). Another former
bureaucrat said that the Pandits were made to leave by
Jagmohan’s government, who promised them that they
would return once he had unleashed a brutal policy on
Kashmiri Muslims.23 A few mentioned that the atmosphere
in the Valley had become such that Pandits did not feel
they would be safe. Yet, it is on this topic where a number
of respondents were silent or did not respond at length. I
suggest that this discomfort was registered as a result of
feelings of both betrayal and guilt, and sadness at the state
of affairs between the two communities today. The guilt
was perhaps an acknowledgment of the ways in which
Islamist discourses were elevated during the militancy, as
calls for azadi (freedom) and a demand for nizam-e-mustafa
(the order of the Prophet) rang from the mosques. Perhaps
my respondents were aware of how this might have
contributed to Pandit fears about their survival in Kashmir
in that period. At the same time, many also felt betrayed,
feeling that the Pandits “just left us here, without letting
us know… it seemed they didn’t care what would happen to
us under Jagmohan” (Interview with participant, Srinagar,
12 June 2014). Whatever they felt about the causes for the
departure of the Pandits, most agreed that the present
generation in Kashmir suffered a loss, as they had grown
up without ‘knowing any Pandits’.
My respondents affirmed that Kashmiri Pandits were an
important part of Kashmir’s history, and that on some
level there was a shared culture between the two communities. At the same time, they spoke to the changes that
occurred between the two communities once Kashmiri
Muslims were seen as being empowered. As a result of
the political context in the state, on some level, a Muslim
identity was being constructed in opposition to what was
seen as a privileged Pandit one.
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Conclusion
In this article, I have presented life narratives—both oral
and written—of Kashmiri Muslims that lived through the
early post-Partition period. The article helps situate how
political subjectivities emerge in zones of conflict, war,
and occupation. Political conflict produces paradoxical
demands and aspirations that individuals are forced to
reconcile. I conclude that it is through the creation of
these paradoxical subjectivities that the state of conflict
is sustained. Today, over 70 years after Partition, debates
over collaboration and resistance, political aspirations
and economic stability, continue in Kashmir as the past
decade has witnessed the rise of a “new intifada” (Kak
2011), which pits the current generation of Kashmiri
youth against the brute force of the Indian state. Given
the heightened forms of modern day surveillance, Indian
militarization, as well as the use of state violence and the
clamping down on any form of dissent, Kashmiris are
once again forced to reconcile their desire for political
freedom with their desire to lead ‘normal’ functional lives.
With such restricted modes of political possibility made
available to them, people continue to live their lives, as
Gowhar Fazili articulates, “as occupied subjects [who]
are constrained by circumstances to exist somewhere
on the spectrum defined by resistance and collaboration
and marked by a bit of both” (Fazili 2018: 206). The initial
compromises made by the earlier post-Partition generation reflect on contemporary circumstances, as debates
rage over the role of the Kashmiri bureaucrat or the police
official who is seen as instrumental in the suppression of
his or her own people. In particular, a number of
Kashmiri Muslims have aspired to join the Indian civil
services, including the case of Shah Faesal, who was
pushed into the limelight for being the poster boy for the
model that Kashmiri youth should aspire to (Huffington
Post 2016). In a scathing critique for the Kashmir Reader,
three Kashmiri youth argued, “these local henchmen of
Indian occupation play a more pervasive role in helping
to consolidate the illegal rule of India over the insurgent
nation” (Dar et al. 2016).
Yet, these very same bureaucrats or police officials argue
that they are serving their community and operating as an
important buffer between the Indian state and its Kashmiri
subjects, not unlike those among the post-Partition
generation. Some have also insisted that their mandate
is ‘mundane and miniscule’, and it is simply a job like any
other job. As the piece in the Kashmir Reader continues,
state collaborators argue that “their only job is to ‘sign
papers’, ‘prepare budgets’, ‘manage the workforce’ or
‘dole out orders’…the signature may approve a PSA (Public
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Safety Act) detention, a budget might be used to purchase
weaponry, and the workforce could be a lethal group of
child murderers” (Dar et al. 2016).
As debates rage, I suggest that the scope for collaboration today is different than it was in the post-Partition
period. The earlier generation lived in a period of multiple
contingencies; they could not predict that India would
erode Kashmir’s autonomy so unceremoniously and that
the plebiscite would be rendered obsolete. They witnessed
these processes taking place in their lifetimes; today’s
generation has no such illusions. While the justifications
the earlier generation had for its complicity may have
held for that time, Kashmiri Muslims who are associated
with the state today are confronted with an overt rebellion
on a scale that the earlier generation never confronted.
The changed conditions after the armed resistance, as
the Indian state has made clear its mandate to completely
obliterate any desire for self-determination through the
destruction of lives and property, render this collaborative
position wholly politically suspect. Furthermore, the rise
of Hindutva in India has brought to fore the contradictions under Nehruvian secularism and has devastating
consequences for the Muslim-majority region. In sum, the
difference between the early post-Partition period and the
post-armed resistance period is that the earlier period was
far more contingent. Today, that fluidity has all
but disappeared.
Nonetheless, through the example of this post-Partition
generation, I hope to demonstrate how local Kashmiris’
active involvement and agentive roles helped them to
make sense of their world and create coherence out of
disparity. They were not passive victims of the state;
while these accounts certainly provide a sense of how
the early Kashmir state government shaped Muslim
identity, they also point to how a number of them made
use of and benefited from institutional mechanisms in
ways that made the most sense to them. These narratives
help us think through political subjectivity as a process
that occurs at the nexus of class, religion, and politics, in
addition to individual personalities and subjectivities, and
more importantly, that these subjectivities are shifting, in
response to changing contexts.
What these life narratives most clearly elucidate is the
extent to which this class of Kashmiri Muslims contested
the logic of the two nation-states, India and Pakistan,
but were also subject to these dominant narratives. The
overarching narratives of the Indian and Pakistani nationstate and their respective nationalisms leave Kashmir,
and Kashmiris, wanting. In treading the path of political

subjectivities in this period of nation-station formation,
these life narratives allow us to envision a different collectivity, one that foregrounds a Kashmiri Muslim-centric
narrative that was formed through particular historical
moments, such as the 1931 agitation and Sheikh Abdullah’s
arrest in 1953. The encompassing Kashmiri Muslim collectivity was a product of a repressive political context; at the
same time, however, this article suggests that uncertainty
and political repression created a rich environment for
alternative and creative political imaginings. In sum, these
life narratives represent the Kashmiri Muslim nostalgia
for lost futures.
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Endnotes
1. A pheran is a type of shirt work by Kashmiri men and
women. It is loose, reaches the knees and is often made of
wool for the long winter months.
2. In this article, even though I am referring to the period
after British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent, I use
the term ‘post-Partition,’ instead of post-colonial or postindependence, given the popular perception amongst most
Kashmiri Muslims that there has been no post-colonial
period in Kashmir as India remains a colonial power in
Kashmir. In the same vein, Kashmiris believe that their
land did not become independent as with the rest of the
subcontinent; rather, it was occupied.
3. As the Indian subcontinent was divided into Muslimmajority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India, Kashmir
was one of the few princely states in which the religious
identity of a majority of its population was different from
the religious identity of its ruler, the Dogra Maharaja Hari
Singh. As the Maharaja brutally squashed an uprising
of Muslims in the region of Jammu, he sought military
protection from India against a subsequent invading tribal
raid from Pakistan who came to ‘liberate’ the regions
Muslims. A murky transfer of sovereignty by the Maharaja
led a majority of the territory to be incorporated into
the Indian Union through a treaty of accession, which
gave India control over the foreign affairs, defense, and
communications of the region. The treaty promised that
the state’s future would be determined ‘by a reference
to the people.’ Both India and Pakistan went to war in
1948, resulting in two-thirds of the former princely state
to be controlled by India, which I refer to as Jammu and
Kashmir, or alternatively, Indian-held Kashmir. One-third
was controlled by Pakistan, which is referred to as Azad
Kashmir or Pakistan-held Kashmir. While Indian-held
Kashmir includes the region of Jammu, Ladakh, and the
Kashmir Valley, I will primary be focusing on the Muslimmajority Kashmir Valley, which remains the primary
site of state violence and resistance against Indian rule.
For brevity, I refer to this portion simply as ‘Kashmir.’
Kashmiri Muslims are a Kashmiri-speaking ethnic group
that constitute a majority of the inhabitants of Kashmir.
See Snedden, The Untold Story.
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4. In 1931, Kashmiri Muslims began their agitation against
the Dogras, a Hindu monarchy that governed Jammu and
Kashmir as a princely state during the period of British
colonial rule. They demanded democratic governance and
better economic and educational rights, especially for the
region’s marginalized Muslim community.
5. This provisionality is marked by multiple UN
resolutions for plebiscite, as well as the cease-fire line,
which situates Kashmir as a ‘dispute’. In the introduction
to Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, the editors state,
“Kashmir’s provisionality poses a threat to India’s identity
as a secular and integrated nation…. It also enables India’s
governance in the region, most notably through Article
370 that establishes the terms of Kashmir’s relationship
to India by granting a degree of autonomy to the state.”
However, India has used Kashmir’s provisional status
to maintain “a facade of democracy, the intentional
framing of Kashmir as a dangerous border zone and
threat to the integrity of the nation, and the continued
implementation of laws of exception that establish
the foundations for the intensive militarization and
concomitant institutionalization of impunity in the
region.” See Haley Duschinski et al, “Rebels of the Streets,”
in Resisting Occupation in Kashmir (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2018) 15-17.
6. I use the term ‘life narrative’ to refer to these sources,
as it is a term that signals shifting self-referential practices
in narratives that engage with the past, and reflect an
identity in the present. Life narratives exist in a variety of
diverse media and take the producer’s life as their subject.
They allow for an understanding of the complex relations
between public and official constructions of history
and private recollections, a process that results in the
constitution of ‘popular memory’. See Sidonie Smith and
Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting
Life Narratives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,
2010) 1; Mahua Sarkar, Visible Histories, Disappearing
Women: Producing Muslim Womanhood in Late Colonial Bengal
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) 134.
7. Unless directly referencing the Government of India,
I use the term ‘state-led’ or ‘state government’ to refer
to the Jammu and Kashmir state government, which was
primarily at the helm of crafting state policies in this
period although it received a vast majority of its funding
from the Government of India.
8. During the armed resistance of the late eighties and
the nineties, thousands of young Kashmiris went across
the border into Pakistan to train and returned once more
to fight against Indian rule. A vast majority of Kashmiri
Pandits, the region’s Hindu minority, left the Kashmir
Valley out of fear of a militancy that was increasingly
inflected with Islamist discourses; some lived in camps in
Jammu, while others lived in cities in India and abroad.
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During and in the aftermath of this iteration of the
militancy, Kashmir became heavily militarized as over half
a million Indian troops patrolled the region and bunkers
and security zones arose in various neighborhoods. As
a result, most of the narratives I gathered were deeply
embroiled with this political present, as my respondents
attempted to ‘explain’ or ‘understand’ contemporary
Kashmir through their recollections of the past. Since
2010, as a result of immense state violence and brutality
against Kashmiri youth, a new generation of ‘home-grown’
militants has once again emerged. The numbers, however,
remain in the hundreds, and have not yet reached the
levels of three decades prior.
9. Sheikh Abdullah was the first Prime Minister of the
Jammu and Kashmir state. After initially supporting the
state’s accession to India, he began to call for a plebiscite
to determine the future of the region. On August 8, 1953,
the Sheikh, who was heralded as the ‘Lion of Kashmir’ and
had led the movement against the Dogras, was arrested
and replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammad, who was more amenable to the Government
of India.
10. I have obtained permission to share identifiers from
my respondents.
11. The term Kashmiriyat refers to a shared, secular
syncretic Kashmiri culture that was popularized by the
post-Partition Jammu and Kashmir governments, in
an attempt to both create a distinct Kashmiri cultural
identity, but also ensure that the state’s accession to
‘secular’ India would be solidified through the propagation
of a secular Kashmiri identity.
12. While the National Conference officially stood for the
ideals of secular nationalism, a number of scholars have
noted that the party and its leadership, especially Sheikh
Abdullah, did not hesitate to use religion for particular
political ends.
13. This is similar to the social base of the Muslim League
in North India and urban Bengal.
14. Jinnah’s visit to Kashmir in 1944 was a critical
moment in defining the National Conference’s alliance
with the Indian National Congress. Jinnah was hosted by
both parties—the National Conference and the Muslim
Conference—but purportedly did not get along with
Sheikh Abdullah, and during his speech to the Muslim
Conference at Jamia Masjid, affirmed that they were the
main representatives of Kashmiri Muslims, which angered
the National Conference party leaders.
15. Their fears were not unsubstantiated, given the lack of
land reform in Pakistan.

16. For example, Anwar’s two brothers, who were against
the National Conference, despite their father’s close ties
with the Sheikh, went to Pakistan.
17. Chitrelekha Zutshi also makes this argument. See
Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, 314.
18. After the Indian government installed Sheikh Abdullah
as the Prime Minister, he was unceremoniously arrested
and jailed, and replaced by his second-in-command, Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammad. As the post-Partition period saw
Kashmir slowly losing its autonomy under Indian rule,
the Sheikh had begun to question the finality of Kashmir’s
accession to India.
19. See, for example, Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman:
Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Farzana
Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim
Representation in Colonial India 1860-1947 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Venkat Dhulipala,
Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for
Pakistan in Late Colonial North India (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016).
20. This uncertainty has been referred to by a number of
South Asian historians, including Neeti Nair. In her book,
Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India,
which contests essentialist understandings of Muslims
and Hindus, Nair describes how none of her respondents,
mostly Hindu refugees from Pakistan, believed that
they would have to ‘leave forever’. This “‘moment of
reckoning,’ the decision to leave their homeland for a new
political configuration or nation lasted a few hours for
some, several months for others… But the memory of the
contingent quality of that decision to leave stayed,” she
states. Similarly, Vazira Zamindar examines the contingent
nature of defining citizenship, as people transversed
borders, through passport regimes in the immediate
post-partition period in India and Pakistan. See Neeti Nair,
Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 220; Vazira
Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South
Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007).
21. My respondents used the term halaat to generally
speak of the Kashmir conflict, and the political situation,
whether it was referring to Naya Kashmir or in the
contemporary period.
22. Chisti was referring to the events of 1947, when the
state massacred nearly two hundred thousand Jammu
Muslims who had rebelled against Dogra rule.
23. Jagmohan was the controversial governor of the state
during the crucial years of the militancy.
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